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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MINNICK v. MISSISSIPPI: RATIONALE OF RIGHT
TO COUNSEL RULING NECESSITATES
REVERSAL OF MICHIGAN v. MOSLEY'S
RIGHT TO SILENCE RULING
I. INTRODUCTION
The Spring of 1991 exploded with controversy as George Holliday's
home video images exposed nightmarish acts of spontaneous police bru-
tality.' The amateur cameraman's shocking revelation captured the at-
tention of the nation, and incited an army of video vigilantes harboring
an insatiable appetite for the discovery of clandestine police activity.2
Mounting pressure arising from the savage beating in Los Angeles, com-
bined with an increasing awareness of the pervasiveness of illicit police
conduct,3 has forced the United States Justice Department to consider
1. Faye Fiore & Phillip Gollner, Video Showing Beating by LA. Officers Investigated, L.A.
TIMES, March 5, 1991, at 28. At about 1 am. Sunday, March 3, George Holliday gazed out across
the street from his second floor apartment window. Suddenly, a white sedan is forced off the road by
ten pursuing police cars. Apparently following orders, the driver got out of his car and dropped
prostrate to the pavement. Holliday then grabbed his camera and began filming. The tape initially
shows three officers surrounding a defenseless man (Rodney King). As Holiday focuses in on the
scene, the three men are beating King with their nightsticks at an accelerating rate while King
strives desperately to protect his head and face. As King writhes on the ground in pain, several
officers continue beating him across his legs, kidney areas, back, neck, and head. As many as ten
policemen were at the scene, most of whom spectated passively, never interceding on behalf of the
brutalized victim. After one officer stomped on King's head, others joined in with aggressive kick-
ing. When the virulent attack subsided, the officers tied King's unconscious body with wire at the
wrists and ankles, called an ambulance, and then abandoned him. Id.
2. Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42; see also More Video Cameras Expected
on Streets of Hampton Roads, Norfolk, Virginia, UPI, May 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current File.
3. See, eg., Video Vigilantes, supra note 2, at 42 (Texas patrolman beat a handcuffed male with
twenty-four blows of a billy club); Carol McGraw & Henry Weinstein, Two Juries Deliver Verdicts
After Abuses by LA. Deputies, Police, Courts: Family of Man Whose Neck was Broken is Awarded
$3.16 Million, Woman Who was Imprisoned Gets $55,000, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at B8 (verdicts
returned against sheriff's deputies--one for breaking a man's neck, and another for imprisoning a
woman for questioning regarding a gang murder); Three Miami Policemen Arrested in Beating,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at A6 (three Miami officers arrested; one for brutalizing an appre-
hended suspect, the other two for lying about it); Jerry Hicks & Gebe Martinez, San Clemente
Officer Held in Rape. Assaults, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al; Metro Digest/Local News in Brief:
Never Taught Not to Use Profanity, Officer Testifies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at 2 (officer charged
1
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hiring additional lawyers.4 A Washington Post headline accurately and
succinctly assessed the damage inflicted upon the reputation of our police
force: "Police Inspire Trust, Fear; Mixed Views . . "' We feel natu-
rally inclined to trust our neighborhood officers; however, reality mani-
fested in the Rodney King beating stirs within us a chilling fear of the
unknown. Even more unsettling is the fact that an investigatory commis-
sion declared that, without the videotape produced by Holliday, the alle-
gations of official misconduct probably would have been dismissed.'
What protection does one have from the long, unrestrained arm of the
law?7 If some officers are so volatile that they exercise unbridled brutal-
ity publicly, what protection is there for the apprehended suspect who, in
the secrecy of stationhouse interrogation, finds himself alone with his
inquisitors?
Establishing individual liberties for persons accused of criminal of-
fenses, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution com-
mands that no person shall be induced to incriminate himself.8 In
with assault); Pamela A. MacLean, Four Oakland Housing Police Convicted of Brutality, UPI, Apr.
12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (Oakland Housing Authority police of-
ficers convicted of a campaign of brutality, intimidation, and false arrests of project residents);
Carolyn Colwell, Timing Adds to Indicted Cop's Battle, NEWSDAY, Apr. 25, 1991, at 33 (Suffolk
County homicide detective indicted for battery); 3 Not Guilty of Assault at Party; Law Enforcement
Jurors Did Not Believe Deputies were Attacked or Had Cause to Storm Bridal Shower, L.A. TIMES,
May 18, 1991, at BI (deputies storm bridal shower clad in riot gear, claimed they were assaulted, but
a neighbor's videotape shows the deputies clubbing handcuffed individuals); Dean E. Murphy, 1988
Video Shows Police Beating; Investigation: LAPD Launches Inquiry After Tape of Officer Striking
Man with Baton is Shown on T V Department Spokesman Calls Images 'Very Disturbing', L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1991, at BI (three year old incident revived by local television station that aired a
home videotape); Beach Attacks, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 1991, at A3 (San Diego police officer jailed
on charges of committing seven early morning rapes and robberies).
4. Stephanie Saul, Complaints Increase, But Prosecution Lags, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1991, at
35.
5. Lynne Duke, Police Inspire Trust, Fear; Mixed Views Played Out in Neighborhood, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al. See also Chiefs Urge New Code of Police Ethics, UPI, Apr. 17, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (due to increasing publicity of police brutality,
police chiefs from across the nation met to draft a new code of police ethics); Law Enforcement
Groups Call for State Hearings on Brutality, UPI, Apr. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Current File (various organizations challenged the California Legislature to establish a task force to
determine if excessive force by police is widespread).
6. Video Vigilantes, supra note 2, at 42.
7. Without an adequate intermediary, such as a loaded video camera or the presence of an
attorney, protection from the long arm of the law cannot be guaranteed. See Andy Court, Off Cam-
era, Brutal Police are Likely to Walk, NEw JERSEY L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 9.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The constitutional foundation of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is based on the respect that government, both state and federal, must accord to the individ-
ual's inalienable rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). "[O]ur accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth." Id
[Vol. 27:181
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Miranda v. Arizona,9 the Supreme Court created a prophylactic rule gov-
erning the admissibility of confessions extracted during custodial interro-
gation."0 The purpose of the Miranda ruling was to ensure that law
enforcement personnel respect the suspect's right to "free" and "unfet-
tered" exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.11
The Miranda prophylaxis imposes two levels of procedural protec-
tion. 2 The first level requires informing the suspect that "he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires."1 3 The second level of protection defines
the procedure that officials must follow when the suspect invokes his
privilege against self-incrimination by asserting either his right to remain
silent or the derivative right to the assistance and presence of counsel.1 4
Miranda's creation of additional protection has generated vigorous de-
bate concerning the proper balance between society's interest in effective
law enforcement and the individual's right to be free from compulsion to
incriminate himself.1"
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have dichotomized the second
level of protection. 6 Thus, the procedure to be followed by law enforce-
ment officials depends on whether the suspect invokes the right to remain
silent or the derivative right to the presence of counsel. 7 In Michigan v.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. at 478-79. As defined by Miranda, custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. Id. at 444.
In theory, rules governing the admissibility of confessions regulate the methods by which offi-
cials obtain incriminating evidence and provide protection of the apprehended suspect. Unfortu-
nately, without counsel present on behalf of the suspect, there is no true regulation of police conduct.
In the privacy of stationhouse interrogations, police activity remains totally unchecked, and the
suspect is at the mercy of his captors.
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 460.
12. Yale Kamisar, The Edwards and Bradshaw Cases The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh
Away, in 5 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 153 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds.,
1984).
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
14. Id. The right to the presence of counsel is a derivative right in that it was established to
assure greater protection of the right to remain silent, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Kamisar, supra note 12, at 153.
15. See various resources cited in 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JAROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.5, at 484-85 (1984), 103 (Supp. 1991).
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Mosley,18 the Court addressed the question of whether police may re-
sume interrogating a suspect who has invoked his right to remain si-
lent.19 Ignoring Miranda's instruction that the accused is no longer
subject to police-initiated questioning once he asserts the right to remain
silent,20 the Mosley court concluded that law enforcement officials can
confront the accused and solicit a waiver of his rights.2
In a subsequent case, Edwards v. Arizona,22 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether police may resume interrogation of the
accused in the absence of counsel after he has invoked his right to the
presence of an attorney.23 The Edwards Court created greater proce-
dural protection for the right to counsel than Mosley established for the
right to remain silent.24 According to Edwards, Miranda unequivocally
imposed a per se rule barring subsequent police-initiated interrogation of
the accused unless his attorney is present, or unless the accused initiates
communication with officials.25
Thus, the Supreme Court has imposed two separate procedures to
be followed depending on whether the suspect invokes the right to re-
main silent or the derivative right to the presence of counsel. If the ac-
cused invokes the right to remain silent, officials may continue their
efforts to induce an incriminating statement.26 If, however, the accused
invokes the right to the presence of counsel, officials are proscribed from
pursuing an inculpatory statement.27
Recently, in Minnick v. Mississippi,2" Mississippi challenged the
Supreme Court to reduce Edwards' procedural protection of the right to
the presence of counsel to the equivalent of Mosley's protection of the
right to remain silent.2 9 Instead of equalizing the amount of procedural
protection as proposed, the Court expanded the scope of protection pro-
vided by Edwards.30
With the reaffirmation and extension of the Edwards per se rule, the
18. 423 U.S. 96 (1975), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
19. Id. at 98.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
21. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04.
22. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
23. Id.
24. Kamnisar, supra note 12, at 154.
25. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
26. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04.
27. Edwards, 451 U.S. 477.
28. 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
29. Id at 492. See generally Respondent's Brief, Minnick, (No. 89-6332).
30. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489, 491.
[Vol. 27:181
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sustaining rationale underlying the Supreme Court's holding in Minnick
v. Mississippi necessitates reversal of Michigan v. Mosley. Mosley should
be replaced with procedural protection equivalent to the protection pro-
vided under Minnick: once the right to remain silent or the right to the
presence of counsel is invoked, all interrogation should cease until coun-
sel for the suspect is present.
II. LAW PRIOR TO MINNICK
A. Miranda v. Arizona
1. The Necessity of "Adequate Protective Devices"
Since 1936, the admissibility of confessions extracted during custo-
dial interrogation was governed by the due process voluntariness test
which involved examination of the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the confession at issue.31 Under the voluntariness test, confes-
sions were deemed inadmissible if police tactics so pressured the suspect
to confess that his will to exercise his privilege to remain silent was bro-
ken. 32 The amount of pressure that could be legally applied to the sus-
pect under the due process test was gradually reduced from torturous
brutality to marathon, tag-team interrogation sessions.3 3 Physical coer-
cion was precluded, but psychological and emotional strategies designed
to weaken the suspect's will and induce confession were developed and
disseminated. 34  The psychological and emotional manipulation of the
suspect that was tolerable under the due process standard became the
focus of the Supreme Court's attention in Miranda v. Arizona.35
The factual scenario described by the Miranda Court did not appear
31. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 435, 437 (1987) (citing
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
One of many undesirable results of applying the voluntariness test was the confusion that arose
from the lack of clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and courts to follow in conforming to
constitutional mandates. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42; Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 492.
See generally Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WAsH. U. L.Q. 59 (1989) (for a comprehensive discussion of
the historical development and perversion of the privilege against self-incrimination).
32. Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 437.
33. Id.
34. Id. Miranda elaborated extensively on the use of psychological stratagems during custodial
interrogation. The Court cited law enforcement instruction manuals used in t~le United States which
teach and encourage insidious techniques to subvert a suspect's constitutional rights in an effort to
elicit confessions. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49 n.8-9.
Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, co-authors of one of the manuals primarily referred to in
Miranda, boast that the techniques for eliciting confessions delineated in their manual derive from
personal experience, and are the most superior psychological stratagems to employ. Id. at 449 n.9.
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1991]
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to involve the overt use of psychological or emotional ploys.3 6 However,
due to the apparent pervasiveness of such conduct and the fact that it
was judicially encouraged as a lawful government practice, the majority
attempted to alleviate the effect of these insidious tactics. The Court de-
termined that the custodial interrogation atmosphere itself is inherently
coercive 7 and violative of the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard,3 8
even in the absence of psychological tactics.39 Thus, the Warren major-
ity concluded that "adequate protective devices" must be imposed to en-
sure that the decision to confess is the product of the suspect's free will,
not compelling pressures.4°
Determining what protective device would provide adequate protec-
tion, the Court considered two possible procedural regulations: inform-
ing the suspect of his rights, and the presence of counsel during
interrogation.4" Initially, Miranda emphasized that an awareness of
36. Id. at 457.
37. Id. at 455. The manuals teach that the primary determinant of a successful interrogation is
privacy-being alone with the suspect undergoing intense questioning. Id. at 449. The manuals also
emphasize the importance of depriving the accused of every psychological advantage. Id. (citing
FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1962); and
CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 99 (1956)).
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461-62. In contrast to the due process voluntariness test, the Fifth
Amendment compulsion standard, as implemented by Miranda in reliance on Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897), barred any influence on the suspect to confess. Id. Because the law is incapable
of quantifying the force of the pressure imposed or its impact on the suspect mentally, it therefore
considers a confession inadmissible if any amount of disingenuous influence is used. Schulhofer,
supra note 31, at 446 (citing Brain, 168 U.S. at 565). Schulhofer adds that:
In self-incrimination analysis, the threshold of permissible pressure is low, and more im-
portantly, the amount of pressure is less significant than the reason why pressures arise.
Disabilities or pressures that have the effect of discouraging silence but are not created for
that reason normally are permissible. But pressure imposed for the purpose of discouraging
the silence of a criminal suspect constitutes prohibited compulsion whether or not it
"breaks the will." This is the clear teaching of the fifth amendment's core applications to
compulsion by legal process. The policy served by the amendment is not limited to
preventing inhuman degradation or breaking the will, but extends to all governmental ef-
forts intended to pressure an unwilling individual to assist as a witness in his own
prosecution.
Id. at 445.
39. Historically, the privilege barred pretrial interrogation that was originally conducted by
overreaching magistrates and justices of the peace. Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 438. However, law
enforcement personnel perform the role of the magistrate in secret, alone with the suspect, and
without the presence of an impartial mediator. Id. (citing Edmund Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1949)). Thus, abuse of the suspect and disregard for
his constitutional privileges is not only inevitable, it is virtually invited. Id. at 448.
Many justices believe it is inconsistent to interpret the constitution as allowing officials to coerce
an uncounseled suspect to submit to custodial interrogation when the magistrates of old were barred
from such improper conduct. Id at 437.
40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 460. The Court's use of the term "free will" reflects its utiliza-
tion of the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard in its analysis and demonstrates its desire to bar
any improper inducement to speak.
41. Id. at 465-79.
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one's rights is an absolute necessity.42 The Court recognized, however,
that mere awareness will not sufficiently mitigate the inherent compul-
sion of custodial interrogation.43 Chief Justice Warren stated that the
presence of counsel would sufficiently insulate the accused from compel-
ling pressures, and is an indispensable safeguard.' The Warren majority
added that an attorney's presence would ensure that police conduct con-
forms to constitutional mandates.45 Ultimately, however, the Court
failed to require the presence of counsel during custodial interroga-
tions.46 Instead, it created the infamous Miranda warnings, and man-
dated that officials must "adequately and effectively"'47 apprise suspects
of their rights prior to interrogation.48 Thus, Miranda implemented a
"protective device" that was concededly insufficient to accomplish the
stated goal of ensuring that one's right to choose between silence and
speech remain compulsion-free.
2. Waiver: Miranda's Achilles Heel
The prophylaxis created by Miranda operates as follows. Once a
42. Id. at 467-68.
43. Id. at 468 n.37, 469-70.
44. Id. at 466, 469. The Court delineated three additional advantages to requiring the presence
of counsel. These advantages include: (1) enhancing the reliability of alleged confessions; (2) reduc-
ing the likelihood of police using coercive measures; and (3) assuring that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police, and that the statement is correctly reported by the prosecution. Id.
at 470.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 478-79.
47. Id. at 467. Although the Court did not expressly define what constitutes "adequate and
effective," it did instruct that the warnings must be an "effective and express explanation" of one's
rights. Id. at 473 (emphasis added). It follows that anything less is inadequate. But see cases cited
in 1 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.8, at 515-18 (1984), at 121-22 (Supp. 1991) that do not
require accurate readings or any explanation. The typical result is that the suspect is ostensibly
mislead into waiving his right.
As one researcher noted:
Even when detectives informed suspects of their rights without undercutting devices,
the advice was often defused by implying that the suspect had better not exercise his rights,
or by delivering the statement in a formalized, bureaucratic tone to indicate that the re-
marks were simply routine, meaningless legalism. Instinctively, perhaps, detectives tended
to create a sense of unreality about the warnings by bringing the flow of conversation to a
halt with the statement, "* * * and now I am going to inform you of your rights." After-
wards, they would solemnly intone: "Now you have been warned of your rights," then
immediately shift into a conversational tone to ask, "Now would you like to tell me what
happened?" By and large the detectives regarded advising the suspect of his rights as an
artificial imposition on the natural flow of the interrogation.
1 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.5, at 483-84 (1984).
48. The decision of the majority not to require the presence of counsel as the "adequate protec-
tive device" is confusing, especially in light of the fact that they devoted almost fifteen pages of their
discussion to emphasizing the importance of counsel in assuring efficacious protection of accused's
constitutional rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-79.
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suspect is taken into custody, he must be "adequately and effectively ap-
prised" of his rights. Subsequent statements are inadmissible unless the
prosecution demonstrates that the accused voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his rights to silence and counsel.49 The Miranda
Court's aspiration of providing meaningful protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination was crippled by its failure to require the pres-
ence of counsel, and by subsequent rulings attacking Miranda's Achilles
heel-the waiver issue.
Unfortunately, Miranda does not expressly define how a suspect
"knowingly and intelligently" waives his rights, but does provide some
clues. First, an intelligent understanding of the privilege arises only
when the suspect is made aware of his rights and the consequences of
relinquishing them. 0 Second, the suspect must expressly waive his
rights and make an inculpatory statement."1
Despite the clear admonition that a suspect must expressly waive his
rights, the Rehnquist Court methodically dismantled Miranda's waiver
standard. In North Carolina v. Butler,2 the Court rejected a per se rule
derived from Miranda requiring that waivers be explicitly made or any
resulting confession is inadmissible.5 3 The Butler court held that an ex-
plicit waiver is not "invariably necessary," and an effective waiver may
49. Id. at 479.
50. Id. at 475. In addition, Miranda emphasized that to convincingly demonstrate that an
adequate waiver was made, the prosecution must bear a heavy burden of proof. Id.
The Rehnquist Court has completely disregarded the "knowingly and intelligently" standard.
It has adjudicated confessions admissible when made by defendants who misunderstood the opera-
tion of their rights, and inadvertently waived them. See, ag., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523
(1987) (holding that inculpatory statements were admissible when defendant, under the impression
that his statements could not be used against him unless in writing, expressed a willingness to speak,
but refused to sign a written statement until his attorney arrived); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157 (1986) (concluding that suspect's waiver was voluntary despite suffering from a psychosis that
impaired his ability to make free and rational choices). Most lower courts follow the Supreme
Court's lead on these issues and allow admission of confessions obviously born of ignorance and
misunderstanding of the operation of one's rights. See I LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.9, at
132 (Supp. 1991). See generally Benner, supra note 31, at 122-51 (for a comprehensive critique of
Connelly). According to Benner, Miranda's holding that:
[C]ustodial interrogation, no matter how brief, constitutes compulsion prohibited under
the fifth amendment-has now been overridden by the new voluntariness test established in
Connelly. Stripped of any requirement that focuses upon the mind of the accused, this new
streamlined version of voluntariness (characterized as simply the absence of police miscon-
duct which offends the Court's sensibilities) opens the door to a wide variety of police
interrogation techniques which, through deception, trickery and surprise, can produce
compelling pressure upon a person in custody to speak.
Id. at 151.
51. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
52. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
53. Id. at 374-76.
[Vol. 27:181
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be inferred from the accused's "actions and words."' 4 In Colorado v.
Connelly," the "heavy" burden of proof placed on the government by
Miranda was lowered to the preponderance of the evidence standard.56
In Connecticut v. Barrett,5 7 the Court held that an invocation of the right
to counsel with respect to written statements does not invoke that right
for purposes of oral statements.5 ' In Colorado v. Spring,59 the Court
affirmed a waiver of Miranda rights despite police deception regarding
the subject matter of the interrogation-' By affirming the validity of a
waiver where an officer deceived the suspect concerning the operation of
his Miranda rights, the Court in Duckworth v. Eagan6 openly invited
disingenuous police conduct.62 Instead of protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination, Miranda's progeny guarantees that if officials inform
the suspect of his rights, no matter how deceptive or misleading their
advice may be, any subsequent statement will be admissible.6"
Examining the rules and instructions promulgated in Miranda re-
garding the invocation and waiver of one's rights, the American Law
Institute noted a perplexing, fundamental inconsistency." The Miranda
54. Id at 375.
Faced with "actions and words" of uncertain meaning, some judges may find waivers
where none occurred. Others may find them where they did. In the former case, the de-
fendant's rights will have been violated; in the latter, society's interest in effective law
enforcement will have been frustrated. A simple prophylactic rule requiring the police to
obtain an express waiver of the right to counsel before proceeding with interrogation elimi-
nates these difficulties.
Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Unfortunately,
the suggestion proposed by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, quoted above, fails to remedy
the fact that custodial interrogations are secret affairs and that the validity of one's "express" waiver
is still dubious at best. Therefore, the presence of counsel to witness what transpires behind closed
doors is the "adequate protective device" that would ensure the veracity of the government's testi-
mony and of the suspect's waiver.
55. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
56. Id. Realistically, "the high standard" and "heavy burden" of demonstrating that a suspect
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is actually the "lightest heavy burden" and
the "lowest high standard to be found." Benner, supra note 31, at 145 n.383.
57. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
58. Id.
59. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
60. Benner, supra note 31, at 120-21.
61. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
62. Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 87 (1989).
63. Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and
the Retention of Interrogation Protection, 49 U. Pr=r. L. Rv. 1007, 1063 (1988).
64. 1 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.5, at 485 (1984) (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 39-40 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968)).
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Court insisted that merely informing the suspect of his rights is insuffi-
cient to dispel the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation.6" Yet
it decided that after a suspect is apprised of his rights, he could then
waive them and incriminate himself.66 If it is true that the custodial at-
mosphere is inherently compelling unless counsel for the accused is pres-
ent, then an alleged waiver is subject to compulsion if made without the
presence of counsel.6 7 The logical conclusion of the Miranda analysis is
that waivers are invalid when made without an attorney present. 68
B. Second Level Miranda Safeguards
The second level Miranda safeguards are those procedures which
law enforcement personnel must follow after a suspect invokes his Fifth
Amendment privilege.69 Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has drawn a
dubious distinction between the invocation of the right to remain silent,
decided in Michigan v. Mosley, and the right to counsel, addressed in
Edwards v. Arizona.70 The Supreme Court has determined that if the
suspect invokes his right to remain silent, police may continue their ef-
forts to elicit a confession. 71 However, if the suspect asserts his right to
the presence of counsel, police must cease their attempts to extract in-
criminating testimony.72
1. The Right to Remain Silent: Michigan v. Mosley
After the suspect has been informed of his rights, if he indicates in
"any manner" a desire to remain silent, Miranda requires that the inter-
rogation be immediately terminated73 and prohibits further question-
ing. 4 However, the Mosley court continued the erosion of the Miranda
safeguards by allowing police to resume interrogation of a suspect who
65. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70.
66. Id. at 475.
67. See 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.5 at 485 (1984) (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 39-40 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968)) (construing Miranda as suggesting
that a waiver obtained from a suspect in custody should be per se involuntary unless counsel is
present).
68. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 154.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981)).
71. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-03.
72. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
73. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 445.
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unequivocally invokes the right to remain silent.75 Mosley, having been
informed of his Miranda rights, refused to answer his inquisitors' ques-
tions. 6 The interrogation ceased, but another officer arrived approxi-
mately two hours later, repeated the warnings, resumed questioning
Mosley regarding a different subject, and ultimately elicited a confes-
sion." Whether this confession was legally obtained would appear to be
easily resolved in light of Miranda's decree that "any statement taken
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise."' 7  However, the Mosley majority rea-
soned that Miranda could not be literally interpreted to prohibit all sub-
sequent interrogation since, the Court presumed, the suspect's ability to
cut off questioning by invoking his right dissipates the coercive pressures
of custodial inquisition.79 The Mosley Court concluded that the admissi-
bility of a confession obtained after the suspect has invoked the right to
remain silent turns on whether his right to cut off questioning is "scrupu-
lously honored." 0 Because Mosley's right to silence was "scrupulously
honored," the Court held that his confession was not extracted in viola-
tion of his right to remain silent.
2. The Right to the Presence of Counsel: Edwards v. Arizona
Miranda further declared that if the suspect expresses a desire for
the assistance of counsel,"1 officials are barred from interrogating him
75. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 112; Valerie D. Jolicoeur, Note, Balancing the Right to Interrogate
Against the Right to Counsek Edwards v. Arizona, 17 GONZ. L. Rlv. 697, 699-700 (1982).
76. Jolicoeur, supra note 75, at 699.
77. Id.
78. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan interprets Miranda as creat-
ing a presumption of illicit compulsion when a confession is evoked through renewed interrogation.
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 114 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting). This presumption should only be
rebutted through the presence of adequate procedural safeguards such as the presence of counsel.
Id. Brennan further asserts that renewed questioning is itself part of the inherently compelling pro-
cess of custodial interrogation that can render a confession inadmissible. Id.
79. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-04.
80. Id. at 104-06. Mosley instructs that the "scrupulously honored" test is satisfied when: (1)
the police immediately cease the interrogation; (2) resume questioning after a few hours cessation;
(3) repeat the Miranda warnings prior to resuming interrogation; (4) a different officer resumes ques-
tioning; and (5) subsequent interrogations are restricted to subjects unrelated to previous interroga-
tions. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 155. As predicted by Kamisar, the first three factors are the
minimum requirements for reinitiating interrogation after the suspect invokes his right to silence.
Id. See, eg., 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.9, at 537 (1984), at 133-34 (Supp. 1991)
(confirming Kamisar's prediction).
But see People v. Mattson, 688 P.2d 887 (Cal. 1984) (rejecting Mosley in favor of a rule that
once a suspect invokes his privilege, any subsequent confession is per se involuntary).
81. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (holding that an invocation of the right to
counsel can be limited, and if it is, the Edwards protection is to be commensurately limited).
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until his attorney is present.82 The Supreme Court reinforced this safe-
guard in Edwards where the defendant invoked his right to the presence
of counsel, but, like Minnick, was subsequently forced to meet with inter-
rogators who were finally successful in eliciting an incriminating state-
ment.83 The Court held that once the suspect asserts his right to have
counsel present during questioning, unless he subsequently decides to ini-
tiate communication with the police, the suspect may not be interrogated
until "his attorney arrives."
III. MINNICK V MISSISSIPPI
Following an escape from a county jail in Mississippi, Robert Min-
nick and James "Monkey" Dyess were burglarizing a mobile home when
they were suddenly interrupted by the arrival of two men." According
to Minnick, Dyess murdered one man while forcing Minnick to kill the
other.86 After fleeing the state, the escapees split up. Four months later
Minnick was arrested in San Diego, California pursuant to murder war-
rants issued in Mississippi. 7 Minnick testified that San Diego police of-
ficers "beat [him] up," "carded him to San Diego County Jail," and
interrogated him without informing him of his rights to silence and coun-
sel.8" Nevertheless, Minnick remained silent.8 9
82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. The suspect must be granted the opportunity to not only consult
his attorney, but also have him present during subsequent questioning. Id. at 470-71. In the interim,
his right to silence must be respected. Id. Recall Miranda's directive that any confession extracted
after the suspect expresses a desire to have counsel present must be the result of coercion, subtle or
otherwise. Id at 474.
Until Edwards, three approaches prevailed among federal and state courts that have confronted
the question of post-invocation waiver of rights: (1) once counsel is requested, a prophylactic pro-
scription of interrogation arises; (2) a prophylactic prohibition of interrogation is imposed except
that which is initiated by the suspect; and (3) application of a case by case, totality of the circum-
stances examination of the alleged confession. Jolicoeur, supra note 75, at 703-05. Edwards effec-
tively overrules the third approach.
83. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478-79. During the coerced interrogation, Edwards willingly
conversed with the detective, but adamantly refused to allow his testimony to be taped-recorded
(plausibly reflecting a misunderstanding of the operation of his rights). Id. Note the striking factual
similarity to Minnick. Minnick eventually made a statement, but was unwilling to sign a waiver.
84. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. For cases defining "initiation," see I LAFAvE & ISRAEL,
supra note 15, § 6.9, at 137-38 (Supp. 1991).
85. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488.
86. Id. at 489; Petitioner's Brief at 2-5, Minnick (No. 89-6332); Respondent's Brief at 2-6, Min-
nick (No. 89-6332).
87. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488; Petitioner's Brief at 2 (No. 89-6332).
88. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 82 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990).
89. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488; Petitioner's Brief at 3 (No. 89-6332); Minnick, 551 So. 2d at 82.
According to Miranda, Minnick's refusal to respond constitutes an invocation of the right to remain
silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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The following day, two agents from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ("FBI") arrived to question Minnick. 9' When jailers arrived to es-
cort him to the interview, Minnick declared that he did not want to see
the FBI agents.91 Despite Minnick's unequivocal invocation of his right
to remain silent, the detention officer forced Minnick to meet with the
investigators.92 During the interrogation, Minnick refused to sign a form
waiving his rights to silence and counsel. 93 When the agents began to
question him regarding the murders, he refused to answer, and requested
assistance of counsel. The agents persisted, and Minnick steadfastly re-
peated that he would only make a statement with his lawyer present.94
Finally, the agents respected his requests, and ceased their interrogation
efforts.95 Minnick was provided counsel, with whom he met on at least
two occasions, and testified that he was instructed not to respond to any
questioning or sign any waiver forms. 96
Two days later, Deputy Sheriff Denham arrived from Mississippi to
interrogate Minnick.97 Once again, Minnick was told by jailers that he
had to talk to Denham and that he "could not refuse."' g  Prior to the
interrogation, Denlham read Minnick his Miranda rights, but Minnick
continued to decline to discuss the murders, sign a waiver form, or allow
any recording of the interrogation to be made.99 Eventually Denham
succeeded in engaging Minnick in conversation concerning subjects unre-
lated to the crimes and ultimately elicited an inculpatory statement."c°
90. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488; Petitioner's Brief at 3 (No. 89-6332). In some jurisdictions this
reinitiation of interrogation would be satisfactory under Mosley. 1 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note
15, § 6.9, at 134 (Supp. 1991).
91. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488; Petitioner's Brief at 3 (No. 89-6332). Minnicek's second invoca-
tion of his right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored.
92. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488.
93. IdL
94. Id.
95. Id. Minnick asserted his right to counsel three times before his request was finally honored.
Petitioner's Brief at 3 (No. 89-6332).
96. Minnick, 111 S. CL at 488, 493.
97. Id. at 488.
98. d at 488-89 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 489, 493; Petitioner's Brief at 4, 11 (No. 89-6332).
100. Minnick, II1 S. Ct. at 493. The infamous Inbau-Reid interrogation manual instructs law
enforcement officials to respond to suspects who initially refuse to discuss matters under investiga-
tion in the following manner:
Pretend to concede him his right, then ask him questions that have no bearing on the
matter under investigation. As a rule, the manual advises us, a suspect will answer ques-
tions unrelated to the investigation. Once he does, the manual tells us, the interrogator
may gradually "start in with questions pertaining to the offense [under investigation]."...
[Ti]he manual assures us, "there are very few persons who will persist in their initial refusal to
talk after the interrogator has handled the situation in this suggested manner."
1991]
13
Trutchley: Minnick v. Mississippi: Rationale of Right to Counsel Ruling Nece
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:181
Relying on Edwards v. Arizona,1"1 Minnick's attorney filed three
motions attacking the admissibility of the confession.10 2 Due primarily
to Denham's testimony regarding the confession, the trial court denied
each motion, convicted Minnick of murder, and sentenced him to
death. 03 Appealing to the Mississippi Supreme Court, counsel reiterated
that once Minnick had invoked his right to the presence of an attorney,
the state was constitutionally barred from reinitiating interrogation of
Minnick without his attorney present." Unpersuaded, the court held
that Minnick's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied under
Edwards when an attorney was made available to him prior to the inter-
rogation with Denham.105 Therefore, the confession was admissible and
his conviction was upheld.
IV. THE MINNICK DECISION
The question addressed by the United States Supreme Court was
whether a confession is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment if
the suspect invokes the right to counsel, confers with counsel, and police
then reinitiate interrogation without the accused's attorney present.10 6
Kamisar, supra note 12, at 171-72 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting FRED E. INI3AU
& JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROOATION AND CONFESSIONS 111-12 (lst ed. 1962)).
According to the records, after being brutalized by San Diego police officers, Minnick unequivo-
cally indicated a desire to exercise his right to remain silent and to negotiate with officials only
through his attorney at least six different times (including his refusals to sign waiver forms). Min.
nick, 111 S. Ct. at 489; Petitioner's Brief at 2-5 (No. 89-6332).
101. 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Petitioner's Brief at 5, Minnick (No. 89-6332). Edwards, arrested for
robbery, burglary, and first degree murder, was informed of his Miranda rights and submitted to
questioning. He later declared that he wanted an attorney before consummating a deal with police
and the interrogation ceased. The next morning, the detention officer informed Edwards that two
other detectives wished to question him. Edwards said that he did not want to speak to them, but
the officer told him that he had no choice. The detectives read him his rights, confronted him with
evidence that allegedly implicated him, and eventually elicited a confession. Edwards, 451 U.S. at
478-79. Edwards' holding reads as follows:
[We now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interroga-
tion by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
102. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Minnick (No. 89-6332).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Minnick v. State, 551 So. 2d 77, 83 (Miss. 1988), rev'd, IlI S. Ct. 486 (1990).
106. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 488. See, eg., Roper v. State, 375 S.E.2d 600 (Ga.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 290 (1989). Based on Edwards, the Georgia Supreme Court held a confession inadmissible
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The Minnick Court determined that the Edwards rule, by preventing po-
lice from persistently reinitiating interrogation,1"7 is designed to ensure
that incriminating statements are not precipitated by compelling pres-
sures. 08 Therefore, the Minnick Court decided that the ban on police-
initiated interrogation should not be lifted once the accused has merely
consulted with counsel. 109 Unless the integrity of custodial confessions
can be assured through specific institutional safeguards, the Supreme
Court concluded that neither the utilization of admissions nor the pro-
curement of waivers are constitutionally legitimate. 10
V. ANALYSIS
By extending Edwards, suspects are protected from tenacious police
efforts to compel a waiver of previously asserted rights, and from the
coercive pressures of prolonged incarceration."' In support of its expan-
sive interpretation of the Edwards prophylaxis, the majority relies on: (1)
a literal interpretation of Miranda's language as utilized in Edwards that
"[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present"; 1 2 (2) the policy established in
Miranda and reaffirmed in Edwards of ensuring that the confession is not
the result of coercive pressures;1" (3) the clarity of the rule's command
and the certainty of its application;" 4 and (4) a repudiation of Missis-
sippi's proposed exception." 5
A. Literal Interpretation of Miranda
To determine the proper second level procedure to follow when the
suspect invokes his right to counsel, the Minnick Court recalled that in
where police reinitiated interrogation without the presence of the suspect's attorney despite the fact
that the suspect had consulted with the attorney and was instructed to remain silent. Id. at 604.
107. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)). Without the
Edwards prophylactic rule, through "badger[ing] or overreaching," no matter how "explicit or sub-
tle, deliberate or unintentional," officials could wear down the accused's resolve and persuade him to
confess despite his previous assertion of Miranda rights. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See il at 492.
111. Id. at 491. Minnick reaffirms that the essence of Edwards is preserving the integrity of the
accused's choice to invoke his rights or relinquish them. Id.
112. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
113. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489.
114. Id. at 490.
115. Id. at 491-92.
1991]
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Edwards it had focused on Miranda's literal instruction that all question-
ing must be terminated until an attorney is present."16 The Minnick
Court also relied on literal interpretations of other excerpts from Mi-
randa in its decision to extend the Edwards protection." 7 First, the pres-
ence of an attorney is an indispensable safeguard which ensures that the
suspect's rights are not violated, and that his statements are not the result
of custodial compulsion. 1 Second, the necessity of having an attorney
includes not only the right to confer with counsel, but also to have him
present during interrogations. 9
In Mosley, however, the majority rejected Miranda's literal instruc-
tion that any subsequent statement obtained during police-initiated inter-
rogation must be the fruit of compulsion.1 20 The Mosley Court claimed
that Miranda's requirement that interrogation cease after an assertion of
the right to silence "tells us nothing" since it fails to prescribe when ques-
tioning may resume.1 2 A perusal of the pertinent Miranda text, in light
of its fifteen page discussion of the necessity of counsel, reveals what the
Miranda court is "telling us": after a suspect asserts his right to silence,
the police cannot resume questioning or in any way seek a confession. t22
An illuminating footnote clarifies what Miranda regarded as the
proper procedure after the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent.
Further police-initiated questioning may be permissible if the suspect's
116. Id at 490 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
117. Id at 491 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466).
118. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
119. Minnick, II1 S. Ct. at 491 (citing to Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).
120. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100-04. Miranda's procedural instruction rejected by Mosley states
as follows:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to
cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to
overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
121. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
122. Miranda subsequently stated that if the police continue to interrogate the accused without
counsel present and eventually elicit a confession, the state bears a heavy burden of proving that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. However,
Kamisar persuasively argues that the logical interpretation is that when a suspect asserts his right to
remain silent, officials are precluded from renewing interrogation. But, the suspect can choose to re-
engage the police in communication. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 154. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of Miranda waivers, compare Berger, supra note 63, with Benner, supra note 31, at 143-47.
[Vol. 27:181
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attorney is present.123 Moreover, Miranda instructs that even if an attor-
ney is present, and even if the interrogation is devoid of coercive police
conduct, inculpatory statements might still be found inadmissible. 124
Dissenting in Mosley, Justices Brennan and Marshall reach the same
conclusion. 125
As an initial, foundational premise to the Mosley holding,126 the
Court claims that by exercising his right to remain silent, the suspect can
regulate when interrogations take place, what questions are asked, and
the duration of the inquisitions.127 This erroneously assumes, however,
that the suspect understands the procedural ramifications of his invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent. Most people, even most attorneys, do
not know that saying "I want to see a lawyer" provides greater proce-
dural protection than saying "I don't want to say anything."12
Another flawed contention advanced by the Mosley majority suc-
cumbs to the same reasoning that undermines its first premise. The Mos-
ley Court argued that preventing the police from reinitiating
interrogation would "deprive suspects of an opportunity to make in-
formed and intelligent assessments of their interests."' 129 This assertion is
based on a mistaken supposition that the suspect is cognizant of the pro-
cedural consequences of his decisions. Moreover, it irrationally
presumes that a suspect can assess his legal interests. Only through the
assistance and presence of counsel can the suspect accurately appraise his
legal situation and the interests at stake.1 30
Mosley's second premise, that scrupulously honoring the suspect's
right to cut off questioning alleviates the coercive pressures of the custo-
dial environment, is equally faulty. The police can hold the suspect for
123. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44.
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present, there
may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. In the
absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of counsel might
be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation process and might fairly be con-
strued as a waiver of the privilege for the purpose of these statements.
Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 115-17 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); Kamisar, supra note
12, at 154.
126. Mosley held that the admissibility of confessions elicited after the suspect asserts his right to
remain silent turns on "whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored." Id. at
104.
127. Id at 103-04.
128. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 157.
129. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102.
130. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 157.
1991)
17
Trutchley: Minnick v. Mississippi: Rationale of Right to Counsel Ruling Nece
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
lengthy periods of incommunicado incarceration, and persistently inter-
rogate him until they are able to wear down his resolve and extract an
inculpatory statement. 1
31
The Mosley majority also claimed that a literal interpretation would
"transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to
legitimate police investigative activity." '132 By focusing on the suspect's
right to terminate questioning, the Mosley Court circumvented Mi-
randa's instruction that a subsequent confession is the result of compul-
sion.131 Since Mosley's holding has been shown to be fundamentally
defective due to faulty premises, suspects are left without adequate pro-
tection. Thus, even if police scrupulously honor the suspect's right to
silence and later return and extract a confession, it violates the accused's
Fifth Amendment privilege. The presence of counsel is the adequate pro-
tective device that would legitimate all custodial interrogation.
B. Ensuring that Subsequent Confessions Are Not the Result of
Coercion
Refusing to find that consultation with an attorney satisfies the Fifth
Amendment, the Minnick Court declared that the purpose of Edwards is
to protect the accused's right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation.134 Since the right to counsel is designed to assure that sub-
sequent statements are not induced by custodial pressure, it would be
worthless if the police are allowed to descend upon him immediately af-
ter his counselor leaves. 3 The Court based its opinion on Miranda's
conclusion that consultation with counsel is insufficient, and that the
presence of counsel provides the necessary protective shield.'36
In contrast, if the right to remain silent is asserted, Mosley allows
officials to continually pressure the accused.1 37 Thus, it is lawful to pres-
sure a suspect into waiving his right to silence, but unconstitutional to
compel him to waive his right to counsel. There is no justifiable reason
to maintain such a procedural distinction.
131. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 476.
132. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102. In light of pervasive abuses prevalent under the procedural guide-
lines established in Mosley, "legitimate" investigative activity must be regulated to provide some
semblance of protection to the individual.
133. Id. at 103-04.
134. Minnick, Ill S. Ct. at 491.
135. Id. at 492.
136. Id. at 491 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).
137. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-04.
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C. Clear and Unequivocal Guidelines
The Minnick Court emphasized that an important aspect of the Ed-
wards ruling is the clarity and certainty of its procedural guidelines.'38
By providing law enforcement officials with specific, concrete procedural
rules, ambiguous determinations of the voluntariness of waivers are elim-
inated. 3 9 Replacing Mosley with a similar bright-line rule would elimi-
nate the ambiguity surrounding the issue of whether a suspect's right to
cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored." Such a rule, ac-
cording to Minnick and others, would provide additional clear and une-
quivocal guidelines to benefit both the state and the accused.1 4 1
D. Rejection of Mississippi's Proposal
Mississippi urged the Supreme Court to reduce the amount of pro-
tection provided under Edwards to the equivalent of the protection estab-
lished under Mosley.' 42 Mississippi argued that when police cease
interrogation efforts upon the suspect's request to meet with counsel, the
suspect will be confident that subsequent requests will also be
respected. 143 The State concluded that the psychologically coercive ele-
ments of custody are thereby sufficiently ameliorated."4 As long as the
police scrupulously honor the suspect's right to have counsel present
when requested, law enforcement personnel should be allowed to contin-
ually confront and interrogate him. 145 The State presciently cautions,
however, that the police should not be allowed to subversively utilize this
right to pressure the suspect into waiving his previously asserted privi-
lege.'46 But how many times would the suspect have to reassert his right
until his resolve deteriorates, he realizes that the right is meaningless,
138. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490. The Warren Court decided to review Miranda for the purpose
of establishing concrete constitutional guidelines to govern the activity of law enforcement personnel
and the decision making process of state and federal courts. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
139. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
140. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490. For a list of cases interpreting whether a suspect's right to
silence has been scrupulously honored under Mosley, see 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 15, § 6.9,
at 538-39 (1984), at 134-35 (Supp. 1991).
141. Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)); Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 679-82 (1988); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634 (1986); Shea v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam); Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983).
See Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 448-52 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of bright-
line, per se rules as an adjudicatory tool.
142. See generally Respondent's Brief, Minnick (No. 89-6332).
143. Id. at 17-20.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 19.
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gives in to police tenacity, and incriminates himself? It is clear that any
subsequent incriminating statement made in the absence of counsel
would be subject to the coercive pressures of renewed questioning.
The Minnick majority rejected this proposal for several reasons.
First, since a "scrupulously honored" rule would allow the police to con-
tinually pressure the suspect into waiving his previously asserted right,
the right to have counsel present would not be adequately protected.147
The concept of this proposal was addressed and repudiated in Miranda.
The Miranda Court recognized that initial advice given by an attorney is
insufficient to dispel the compulsion inherent in the secret world of custo-
dial interrogation.14
Second, the "scrupulously honored" rule would eradicate the clear
and unequivocal nature of Edwards' second level right-to-counsel proce-
dure. 149 Third, because the Edwards protection could "pass in and out of
existence multiple times prior to arraignment, at which point the same
protection might reattach by virtue of [the] Sixth Amendment," imple-
mentation of the proposal would spawn inordinate confusion.' 50 Actu-
ally, due to years of experience under Mosley's guidelines, confusion
would not arise. Officials would understand that as long as they "honor"
an invocation of the right to counsel, and temporarily cease interroga-
tion, they could reinitiate questioning until the accused reasserts his
right.
Fourth, the proposed rule would create a sensitive issue over what
constitutes sufficient consultation to satisfy Edwards, and would lead to
inquiries skirting into the impermissible realm of the attorney-client priv-
ilege. 5 ' Finally, the Court anticipates that since the police would be free
to reinitiate interrogation of the accused once he has consulted with
counsel, dilatory assistance from counsel would be encouraged. 5 '
E. A Final Argument. Primary Right v. Derivative Right
By precluding the admissibility of a statement obtained in the ab-
sence of counsel, Minnick affirms Edwards' establishment of greater pro-
tection for the suspect who invokes the right to counsel than the suspect
147. Minnick, III S. Ct. at 491.
148. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).
149. Id at 492.
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who invokes the right to silence. I Since the right to counsel is a deriva-
tive right granted to ensure the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination, why should the derivative right receive greater protection
than the right to silence? 54 Yale Kamisar argues that it is equally wrong
for the police to renew interrogation of the suspect after he invokes the
primary right to silence as it is when he invokes the derivative right to
counsel.155 He further asserts that if the accused indicates or expresses
that he does not want to speak, then he is in essence invoking both his
primary right to silence and his derivative right to counsel.156 Thus, af-
ter indicating in any manner an unwillingness to speak, the suspect
should not be subject to further police-initiated interrogation until coun-
sel is present. As Kamisar concludes, either Mosley or Edwards was
wrongly decided. The same standard of procedural protection should be
applied to both the right to counsel and the right to silence, either ac-
cording to the dictates of Mosley or Edwards."7 It is illogical for the
Supreme Court to continue to recognize two different procedures.
153. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 154.
154. Id. at 157. Writing in dissent with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia states: "Either
Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was." Minnick, I 11 S. Ct. at 497 (quoting Kamisar, supra
note 12, at 157). However, Justice Scalia conveniently failed to include Kamisar's conclusion.
Kamisar concluded that Mosley was incorrectly decided. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 157.
155. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 157. Kamisar disagrees with the Court's interpretation that
Miranda allows greater flexibility for police to resume questioning the suspect when he invokes the
right to remain silent than when he asserts the right to the presence of counsel. Id. at 154. Kamisar
argues:
If anything, the language [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470] seems to cut the other way: (1) once
a suspect asserts his right to remain silent, the police may not resume interrogation period
(but the suspect may change his mind and "initiate" reinterrogation); (2) once the suspect
invokes his right to counsel the police may not resume interrogation (again, this doesn't
mean the suspect can't change his mind, without any pressure or prompting by the police,
and "initiate" reinterrogation) unless and until an attorney arrives and meets with his
client.
Id. He continues that "a more plausible interpretation" which is supported by an accompanying
footnote, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44, "is that regardless of which right the suspect asserts, police
interrogation may resume in the presence of counsel." Id.
156. Id Kamisar cites the A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 140.8(2)(d) (1975) for further support for this interpretation noting that the American Law Insti-
tute makes no distinction between invocation of the right to silence and the right to counsel. Id. at
154-55. The Code provides that if the suspect asserts either right, officials may not pursue a waiver
or question the suspect until he has met with an attorney. Id (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE commentary at 371 (1975)). Further supporting the proposition that the
distinction between the two procedures is erroneous is the fact that only one year prior to Mosley, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a rule of criminal proce-
dure that did not recognize a distinction. Id. at 155.
157. Id. at 157.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Minnick court concluded that mere consultation with one's at-
torney is itself an insufficient safeguard of the privilege against self-in-
crimination because it does not prevent police from continually
confronting the accused without counsel present, nor does it eliminate
the inherent pressures that accompany prolonged incarceration. Thus, to
ensure that subsequent statements are not induced by coercive pressures
of custody, the Minnick court extended the Edwards prophylaxis. In
contrast, Mosley's "scrupulously honored" test affords law enforcement
officials the subversive opportunity to retain the accused in prolonged
custody subject to innumerable attempts to extract an incriminating
statement. Therefore, even if its demonstrable analytical flaws are ig-
nored, Mosley should be reversed based on the fact that it fails to ensure
that subsequent statements are not induced by coercive pressures.
Christopher S. Thrutchley
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